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ALFRED GALICHON
y
Abstract. I show that the structure of the rm is not neutral in respect to regulatory
capital budgeted under rules which are based on the Value-at-Risk.
Keywords: value-at-risk.
MSC 2000 subject classication: 91B06, 91B30, 90C08
Introduction. The single most used measure of nancial risk is undoubtedly the Value-
at-Risk (VaR). The VaR at level 95% is dened as the minimal amount of capital which
is required to cover the losses in 95% of cases. In statistical terms, the value-at-risk is the
quantile of level  of the losses, namely
V aR (X) = inf fx : Pr(X  x) > g:
(note that unlike the most widely adopted convention in the literature, we chose to count
positively an eective loss).
The widespread popularity of the Value-at-Risk is due to its adoption as a the "1st pillar"
in the Basle II agreements. Despite its widespread use and simplicity, the Value-at-Risk
is highly criticized among academics. The literature on risk measures classically denes
a set of axioms which satisfactory risk measures should satisfy (see [1]). Among these,
subadditivity: a risk measure  should satisfy (X + Y )  (X)+(Y ). While this axiom
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is widely accepted in the academic community, it is perhaps ironical that VaR fails to satisfy
this subadditivity axiom as it has been widely documented (we come back to that below).
The subadditivity axiom is generally motivated by a loose invocation of risk aversion, or
preference for diversication. In this note I propose a quite dierent argument to motivate
the importance of the subadditivity axiom. Assuming the value-at-risk is used to budget
regulatory capital requirements, and assuming that the managers have an incentive to
minimize these capital requirements, I show that the lack of the subadditivity property
induces the possibility for the management to optimally divide their risk in order to minimize
their budgeted capital: the structure of the rm is not neutral to the aggregated capital
requirement. More precisely, I show that for any level of the value-at-risk there is a division
of the risk which sets the aggregated capital requirement to zero.
The problem. Consider a trading 
oor which is organized into N various desks. For
each trading desk i = 1;:::;N, call Xi the random variable of the contingent loss of trading

oor i. The total random loss of the trading 
oor is X =
PN
i=1 Xi, we suppose that this
amount is bounded: X 2 [0;M] almost surely.
We suppose that each desk budgets a regulatory capital equal to its VaR at level  2 (0;1),
V aR (Xi). Consequently the total amount of regulatory capital which the management
needs to budget is
PN







Xi = X a.s., and V aR (Xi)  0:
As the management has full control over the structure of the rm, it results that it has the
choice over N and over the random variables (X1;:::;XN) which satises the constraints.
Note that the economical risk which the trading 
oor bears is X =
PN
i=1 Xi, and thus
the regulatory capital to be budgeted should be V aR (X) > 0. However, I shall show that,
under mild assumptions, there is a structure of the rm such that the capital budgeted
under the rule above is zero. The assumption needed is the following:





































9VAR AT RISK 3
The optimal structure. In that case, there exists a sequence of real numbers x0 = 0 <
x1 < ::: < xN = M such that Pr(X 2 (xi;xi+1)) < 1    for all i = 1;:::;N   1.
We are therefore going to consider the digital options
1
Xi = X1fX 2 (xi;xi+1)g
(note that these options can be approximated by linear combinations of standard calls and
puts, or butter




As we have Pr(Xi > 0) < 1   , it follows that
V aR (Xi) = 0:
Therefore the capital to be budgeted under this structure of the rm is the sum of the
capital to be budgeted for the dierent trading desks, which is zero.
Remarks.
1. This example shows that it is possible to tear down the risk into small pieces which
are indetectable by the Value-at-Risk.
2. Note that the case we have here, which is the worse case (at least for the regulator's
point of view), is the case where all the Xi's are comonotonic. Comonotonicity indeeds
turns out to be the regulator's worse case, which justies the comonotonic additivity axiom
put forward a large literature: see [10].
3. The above considerations have lead [6] to dene the axiom of strong coherence, which
is a natural requirement so that the structure of the rm be neutral to risk measurement.
In that paper, strong coherence is shown to be equivalent to the classical risk measures
axioms.
1this is a slight abuse of terminology as a digital option would more correctly characterize





































4. The assumption that the distribution of the risk X be absolutely continuous is crucial.
There are connections to be explored with the theory of portfolio diversication under
thick-tailedness, see [8].
Possible extension. It would be interesting to consider the above problem with over-





V aR (Xi) + (N) s.t.
N X
i=1
Xi = X a.s., and V aR (Xi)  0:
where (N) is increasing with N and can be interepreted as an a priori penalization of the
rm's complexity by the regulator. The problem of determining an optimal (N) from the
point of view of the regulator in a properly dened setting is of interest.
y  Ecole polytechnique, Department of Economics. E-mail: alfred.galichon@polytechnique.edu
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